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INTERNATIONAL LEGAL UPDATES
uniteD StateS
uniteD StateS linKeD to 
RenDition pRactice in eaSt 
aFRica
The U.S. government faces increasing 
criticism for engaging in extraordinary 
rendition — the practice of removing indi-
viduals in the custody of one country to 
another, where they are interrogated and 
often tortured on behalf of another nation. 
This tactic has been used by the United 
States in its War on Terror and has raised a 
number of instances in which U.S. officials 
have sanctioned, and arguably participated 
in, heinous human rights violations. What 
little is known of the U.S. practice implies 
involvement in the secret and illegal detain-
ment of men, women, and children. Recent 
discoveries about activities acknowledged 
by U.S. and Ethiopian officials in East 
Africa shed light on a partnership with 
the governments of Kenya, Somalia, and 
Ethiopia that has led to the disappearance 
of at least 140 individuals fleeing violence 
in Somalia.
In September 2006, the United States 
launched several bombing raids in Moga-
dishu, Somalia, targeting Fazul Abdullah 
Mohammed, the alleged al-Qa’ida mem-
ber and mastermind of the 1998 bomb-
ings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania. Thousands of individuals fled 
for the Kenyan border. The Kenyan anti-
terror police, who were created with U.S. 
funding, captured at least 150 individuals 
without acknowledgment of their deten-
tion or disclosure of their whereabouts, 
and placed the prisoners on secret flights 
departing from Kenya. Flight manifests 
documenting all passengers on board name 
85 people, including at least 11 children 
and 13 women, including at least two 
pregnant women who gave birth while in 
custody, as well as Fazul Abdullah’s wife. 
The prisoners were taken to Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia and harshly interrogated by U.S. 
officials. Some prisoners were released 
and only one was charged by Ethiopian 
officials. The whereabouts of over 40 pris-
oners remains unknown.
In an interview aired on the U.S. televi-
sion program Frontline, former U.S. Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI) special 
agent Jack Cloonan stated that he believes 
the FBI and Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) not only knew about these events 
but were likely crucial in orchestrating 
them.
The Muslim Human Rights Forum filed 
for an injunction in Kenyan court in Sep-
tember 2007, challenging the legality of 
the detentions. Family members of the 
prisoners who spoke out publicly have 
disappeared. Meanwhile, in March 2008, 
President Bush vetoed legislation that 
would ban the CIA from using interroga-
tion techniques more coercive than those 
approved by the U.S. military.
While the United States and the interna-
tional community have debated the legal-
ity of U.S. interrogation techniques and 
detention of alleged terror suspects, the 
U.S. partnership in East Africa reveals 
U.S. complacency in the taking of women 
and children as hostages in the course of 
these secret investigations. Little is known 
about the treatment of the detained women 
and children, though the potential for addi-
tional human rights violations is chillingly 
present. Amnesty International denounced 
the actions of the United States and its 
East African partners and claimed that the 
detention of these individuals “violates the 
right to liberty and security of the person 
and the right not to be subjected to arbi-
trary arrest or detention.”
SupReMe couRt upholDS 
execution by lethal inJection 
but iMpoSeS MoRatoRiuM on 
Death penalty While DeciDing 
caSe
On September 25, 2007 the Supreme 
Court (Court) granted certiorari to hear 
Baze v. Rees. In Baze, the Court addressed 
the constitutionality of a particular method 
of execution for the first time since 1878. 
The case did not address the constitu-
tionality of capital punishment generally. 
Although the Court ultimately upheld the 
contested method of execution by lethal 
injection, in granting certiorari, it enacted 
a de facto moratorium on executions until 
it issued its decision.
At question in Baze was whether lethal 
injection as method of execution violates 
the Eighth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion, which bans cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. The Petitioners in Baze were 
each convicted for murders in the state of 
Kentucky and sentenced to death. After 
exhausting all levels of appeal in state 
and federal courts, Petitioners filed a civil 
action in the Supreme Court, claiming 
that the method of lethal injection used by 
Kentucky “create[s] an unnecessary risk of 
pain and suffering.” 
The execution protocol used in Ken-
tucky involves the administration of a 
three-drug formula, intended to adminis-
ter deadly potassium nitrate only after a 
prisoner is unconscious. The executioner 
first administers Thiopental, a short-acting 
anesthetic that is not widely used in medi-
cal practice today. Second, the executioner 
delivers pancuronium, which paralyzes 
the prisoner’s voluntary muscles without 
numbing potential pain and suffering. If 
the prisoner wakes after the brief effects of 
the Thiopental wear off, he or she is fully 
conscious and capable of feeling pain, yet 
remains paralyzed and unable to commu-
nicate. Finally, the executioner injects the 
prisoner with potassium chloride, causing 
cardiac arrest. A doctor and coroner then 
verify the cause of death. Used alone or in 
combination with pancronium, potassium 
chloride would cause a human to scream in 
pain before ultimately undergoing cardiac 
arrest.
The Petitioners argued that the Court 
should add an “unnecessary risk of excru-
ciating pain” test, while the State of Ken-
tucky argued that standard is too broad, 
and instead, a “substantial risk” of unnec-
essary pain test should apply.
In amicus briefs submitted to the Court, 
the American Society of Anesthesiolo-
gists stated that physicians are ethically 
prevented from participating in executions. 
The nonprofit Anesthesia Awareness Cam-
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paign requested that the Court consider the 
significant risk of “anesthesia awareness” 
— a condition in which the patient regains 
consciousness after anesthesia is adminis-
tered but is unable to communicate.
On April 16, 2008, the Court announced 
its ruling in Baze. In the seven-to-two deci-
sion, the Court upheld the constitutionality 
of Kentucky’s lethal injection practice. To 
qualify as cruel and unusual punishment, 
the Court wrote, the practice must present 
a “substantial” or “objectively intolerable 
risk of harm.” According to the Court, the 
Petitioners failed to prove this standard. 
Since the Court issued its ruling in Baze, 
ending the seven-month moratorium on 
the death penalty, at least five states have 
conducted a total of seven executions.
Despite the ruling, an Ohio judge 
recently ordered that state to stop using 
a lethal injection practice similar to that 
contested in Baze, noting that although the 
practice was constitutional, it still would 
violate an Ohio statute requiring that exe-
cution by lethal injection “quickly and 
painlessly cause death.” Instead, the judge 
ordered the state to use a large dose of bar-
biturates in conducting executions.  
A 2007 Gallup poll shows that 69 
percent of U.S. citizens favor of the death 
penalty, up two percent from 2006. Cur-
rently, 37 states use lethal injection as the 
primary means of execution. Yet the num-
ber of executions has dropped in several 
states prior to the Court’s decision to hear 
Baze due to concerns about the methods 
employed. 
In December 2007, New Jersey Gover-
nor John Corzine signed the first legislative 
repeal of the death penalty in the United 
States since 1965. According to the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union, this reflects a 
larger shift in national sentiment towards 
the death penalty. The international com-
munity shows a significant trend away 
from the death penalty: on December 11, 
2007, the United Nations General Assem-
bly called for immediate moratorium or 
abolition of the capital punishment. One 
hundred four nations voted in favor of the 
resolution, and only 54 voted against it.
inteRnational violence againSt 
WoMen act pRopoSeD on the 
Senate FlooR
On October 31, 2007, U.S. Democratic 
Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware intro-
duced the International Violence Against 
Women Act (IVAWA) to the Senate. The 
bill proposes creating an Office of Wom-
en’s Global Initiatives (Office), mandates 
that the President of the United States 
“develop and commence implementation 
of a comprehensive, five-year international 
strategy to prevent and respond to violence 
against women and girls internationally,” 
and requires special reporting mechanisms 
on the status of female refugees and other 
vulnerable populations. The Senate rec-
ommended IVAWA to the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, where it awaits 
debate. IVAWA is currently sponsored by 
13 Senators and was drafted in collabora-
tion with over 100 non-governmental orga-
nizations, including Human Rights Watch 
and the Global AIDS Alliance.
The Office would be located within the 
Department of State. It would coordinate 
all international women’s issues and direct 
and implement a comprehensive national 
strategy to prevent violence against women 
worldwide. From 2008 to 2012, the Office 
would receive $10 million annually to 
administer such programs. It would be 
established within the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID), 
where it would receive $15 million annu-
ally from 2008 to 2012 to carry out USAID 
activities to improve the status of women. 
The IVAWA would identify between 
ten and 20 ethnically different countries 
that face particularly high levels of vio-
lence against women; determine how this 
violence negatively impacts the growth of 
each country; assess each government’s 
efforts to control such violence; and 
develop programs to run in coordination 
with those governments. The goals are 
to improve women’s status with regards 
to the law, health, education, economic 
advancement, public awareness, and social 
norms. 
When presenting IVAWA, Senator 
Biden stated that violence against women 
could no longer be viewed as simply a 
familial or cultural issue, but rather must be 
seen as a pervasive and deleterious human 
rights violation. Senator Biden hopes that 
IVAWA will confront the crises of HIV/
AIDS, human trafficking, female genital 
mutilation, rape, and the use of violence 
against women as a weapon during periods 
of conflict.
Perhaps acknowledging that serious 
issues of violence against women exist 
within the United States, Senator Biden 
conceded that no single country has the 
answer to this problem, nor does IVAWA 
propose to fix it. IVAWA represents a con-
certed effort to reduce the occurrence of 
violence against women in regions of the 
world where it prevents respect and dignity 
for human rights and hinders growth and 
development. 
latin aMeRica
cuba: FoReign MiniSteR SignS 
huMan RightS tReatieS
On February 28, 2008, Cuban Foreign 
Minister Felipe Pérez Roque signed the 
International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights (ICCPR) and the Inter national 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cul-
tural Rights (ICESCR), two major inter-
national human rights treaties that former 
Cuban President Fidel Castro opposed for 
over three decades. Among countless other 
rights, the two treaties include the rights 
to freedom of expression, association, 
and movement. Specifically, the ICCPR 
includes the right to freedom of association 
in trade unions or political parties and the 
right to vote in elections, but it excludes 
the right to live in a multi-party democ-
racy. The ICESCR, includes the right to 
employment, fair wages, social security, 
education, the freedom to form and join 
trade unions, and the highest standard of 
physical and mental healthcare. 
In his long standing opposition to these 
treaties, Fidel Castro argued that the ICCPR 
could be a tool of “imperialism” against 
Cuba. He also specifically opposed articles 
on education, arguing that they could lead 
to privatization, and on independent unions 
because he believed these types of unions 
only suited to capitalist countries. Despite 
Fidel Castro’s opposition, on December 
10, 2007 — while Fidel Castro was still 
Presi dent — Pérez Roque announced 
Cuba’s intention to sign the covenants and 
open its doors to international scrutiny by 
the United Nations Human Rights Coun-
cil’s Universal Periodic Review in 2009. 
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Through this process, the Council will 
review Cuba’s fulfillment of its human 
rights obligations and commitments. Soon 
after Pérez Roque’s announcement, Fidel 
Castro reminded Cubans of the reasons for 
his fervent opposition to the covenants. In 
February, four days after Raul Castro suc-
ceeded his brother as President, however, 
Cuba signed the covenants. After signing 
the covenants, Pérez Roque stressed that 
the government would register “reserva-
tions or interpretative declarations it con-
siders relevant.” 
Amnesty International strongly sup-
ports the treaties and argues that, hav-
ing signed them, Cuba should release the 
58 individuals currently held as prison-
ers of conscience. Among those detained 
are Alfredo Pulido López and Normando 
Hernández González. Pulido López is a 
human rights defender and dentist who 
was ousted from his clinic and detained 
in March 2003 on charges of being a 
“counter-revolutionary.” While in deten-
tion, Pulido López has developed more 
than seventeen different chronic illnesses, 
including osteoporosis, hypoglycemia, and 
chronic bronchitis. Likewise, Hernández 
González was arrested under Article 91 of 
the Cuban Penal Code, which condemns 
“acts against the independence or territo-
rial integrity of the state” for criticizing 
state-run entities and services. He was 
sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment in 
March 2003. While in prison he has not 
only been denied proper medical attention, 
leading him to develop a serious gastro-
intestinal condition, but was also denied 
the right to go to Costa Rica after Costa 
Rican legislators obtained a humanitarian 
visa for him. Cuban activist groups, among 
them the Cuban Commission on Human 
Rights and National Reconciliation, say 
that the signing of ICCPR and ICESCR 
is positive news and that they hope that it 
marks a turning point for human rights in 
that country. 
guateMala: ÁlvaRo coloM 
oppoSeS the Death penalty
The Guatemalan Congress passed the 
Law Regulating the Application of the 
Death Penalty to those Sentenced to Death 
in February. This bill gives the Head of 
State the right to decide whether to grant 
clemency to individuals on death row.
In 2002, Guatemala’s Constitutional 
Court suspended the death penalty because 
the existing law was not explicit as to 
which body of government had the power 
to grant clemency. Guatemala has not 
applied the death penalty since June 2000 
when it executed two members of a kid-
napping ring. The Court ordered Congress 
to amend the law to specify which body 
has the authority to grant last-minute par-
dons to prisoners facing the death pen-
alty. Six years later, Congress passed a 
bill giving the President that power. The 
law’s passage also removed the obstacle to 
reintroducing the death penalty in light of 
recent public outcry over the murder of 11 
public transportation drivers and assistants 
by youth gang members. 
Advocates for the law, including for-
mer Presidential candidate Otto Pérez 
Molina, argue that the death penalty is 
necessary to deter violence. According to 
the United Nations, Guatemala is the third 
most violent country in Latin America, 
with violence responsible for at least 16 
deaths daily. Once Congress passed the 
bill, international organizations, includ-
ing Amnesty International, sent letters to 
President Álvaro Colom, urging him not to 
reinstate the death penalty but to seek bet-
ter solutions to deter violence. 
The law gave the President 30 days to 
decide whether to commute a prisoner’s 
death sentence to the maximum 50-year 
prison sentence. If the President did not 
make a pronouncement in that time, the 
execution would go forward. After the law 
came into effect, 34 prisoners on death 
row would receive 30 days to ask for the 
President’s pardon. 
On March 14, however, President Colom 
vetoed the bill, stating that it violated prin-
ciples established in Articles 2, 3, 15, 18, 
19, and 46 of the Guatemalan constitution. 
In addition, the President acknowledged 
that Guatemala is party to the American 
Convention on Human Rights, which con-
tains specific provisions relating to the 
use and extension of the death penalty and 
proposes that states that have abolished the 
death penalty do not reinstate it. He argued 
that this bill was unconstitutional because 
Article 46 of the constitution establishes 
that “in matters relating to human rights, 
the treaties and conventions ratified by 
Guatemala take precedence over domes-
tic law.” The President suggested that 
the death penalty does not necessarily 
reduce violence, highlighting instances of 
increased violence immediately following 
the use of the death penalty in the United 
States. He concluded that to reduce vio-
lence, the criminal justice system must be 
more effective and criminal enforcement 
more pervasive. 
Despite his fervent opposition, Colom’s 
veto may be easily overturned. To over-
turn it, Congress would need a two-thirds 
majority — 105 of 158 votes. When Con-
gress passed it in February, 140 members 
supported it. 
SolDieRS FounD guilty oF 
Killing counteR-naRcoticS 
agentS in coloMbia
On February 18, 2008, a Colombian 
judge found Colonel Byron Carvajal Oso-
rio and 14 other members of the military 
guilty of aggravated homicide for a mas-
sacre in Jamundí, Colombia. This mas-
sacre occurred on May 22, 2006, when 
a unit of the Colombian army killed an 
informant and ten elite counter-narcotic 
agents to prevent the discovery of between 
220 to 440 pounds of cocaine hidden in a 
psychiatric home belonging to the mafia. 
The informant led the ten counter-narcotics 
agents, who belonged to a U.S.-trained 
counter-narcotics commission, to the psy-
chiatric center to find cocaine. A few 
months before this massacre, the Director 
of the judicial police praised the counter-
narcotics commission for breaking up mul-
tiple drug rings, seizing over 4.4 tons of 
cocaine, and capturing over 200 traffick-
ers, including many wanted for extradition 
to the United States. 
Initially, the head of the Colombian 
army announced that the massacre had been 
a tragic case of “friendly fire” because the 
soldiers had confused the police unit for 
leftist rebels. Evidence collected immedi-
ately following the massacre, however, 
revealed that the informant and agents 
were unable to defend themselves from the 
illegal attack. Minutes after the massacre, 
the soldiers sent incriminating text mes-
sages later recovered by investigators. In 
response to the discovery of this evidence, 
Colombia’s Chief Criminal Investigator 
Mario Iguarán, said that the deaths were 
not the result of a mistake but rather “a 
deliberate criminal decision,” and that the 
army was “doing the bidding of drug traf-
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fickers.” In addition, government officials 
collected 150 bullets and seven grenades. 
After examining the bodies, investigators 
declared that the men had not been killed 
while in combat but in an unexpected 
attack. Shortly after the massacre, Colonel 
Carvajal Osorio, two other officers, and 
twelve soldiers were accused of aggravated 
homicide. 
Soon after this episode, human rights 
organizations demanded that those guilty 
of the killings, in particular high-ranking 
officers, be held accountable for their 
crimes. Human Rights Watch (HRW) and 
others charged that Colombia’s sentencing 
practices convey “the message that abuses 
are rarely, if ever, going to be punished.” 
In a letter to Colombia’s President Alvaro 
Uribe, HRW charged that in Colombia 
“low-ranking officers sometimes get pun-
ished, but hardly ever is a commanding 
officer prosecuted.” Based on international 
pressure for a prompt and honest trial, 
the judiciary held that a military tribunal 
was not competent to try these soldiers. 
Despite the judiciary’s efforts to promote 
efficiency, the trial lasted approximately 
twenty months, involved no less than 100 
testimonies, and cost millions of dollars. 
During this time, President Uribe admitted 
before the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights in Costa Rica that “in 
Jamundí, the army had murdered some 
policemen.”
Two years after the massacre, Judge 
Edmundo López delivered his official ver-
dict, finding that Colonel Carvajal ordered 
an ambush on the counter-narcotics agents 
and that the other 14 participants were 
responsible as co-conspirators. During the 
trial, the Prosecutor brought 33 witnesses 
and 417 photos demonstrating that the 
massacre’s aim was to protect cocaine 
from discovery. In early May, Judge López 
handed down a 54-year sentence for Car-
vajal, a 52-year sentence for his second-
in-command, and 13 50-year sentences for 
the remaining participants. The maximum 
murder sentence in Colombia is 60 years. 
Equipo Nizkor, a regional human rights 
NGO, proposes that this massacre suggests 
a strong link between Colombian drug 
dealers and the military. 
aFRica
libeRia cReateS Special couRt 
FoR Sexual violence
Liberia’s 14-year civil war displaced 
approximately 850,000 people and caused 
the deaths of about 270,000 more. During 
this conflict, rape and violence against 
young girls and women ran rampant; and 
despite Liberia’s peace deal signed in 
2003, the violence against women has 
continued, and the perpetrators commit 
these crimes with impunity. A government 
survey conducted between 2005 and 2006 
in ten of Liberia’s 15 counties reported 
that out of the 1,600 women interviewed, 
92 percent reported having been victims of 
sexual violence. 
In response to the escalating violence 
against women, Liberia’s Information Min-
ister, Laurence Bropleh, told the Integrated 
Regional Information Network (IRIN) that 
the Liberian government has created a 
special court to deal with the rising rape 
cases, as well as other forms of violence 
against women.
In December 2005, the Liberian gov-
ernment enacted a new law criminalizing 
rape and providing sentences ranging from 
seven years to life imprisonment. Since 
then, according to government statistics, 
instances of rape have continued to increase, 
with about half of the reported cases being 
committed against girls between the ages 
of ten and 15. A December 2006 IRIN 
article reported that rapes against young 
girls and women occurred on a daily basis, 
with most cases going unreported in the 
news. 
Regular courts currently do not address 
sexual violence because state prosecutors 
are busy with other cases. This has resulted 
in a slow progression of rape cases through 
the court system. In other instances, the vic-
tims of sexual violence are either deterred 
by the stigma associated with rape or are 
too scared to file complaints.
Advocacy groups, including the Asso-
ciation of Female Lawyers of Liberia 
(AFELL), have been advocating for the 
special court for two years. In November 
2007, the United Nations Mission in Libe-
ria (UNMIL) issued a report saying, “[t]he 
failure of the state to prosecute impacted 
negatively on the rights of women and 
girls to equal protection afforded by the 
law.” The establishment of the new court, 
however, serves as a promising step for 
women’s rights.
Charlotte Abaka, UNMIL Independent 
Human Rights Expert, said that she is 
“encouraged” by the steps taken to create 
the special court and that “[t]he undue 
delay in prosecuting such cases will now 
be a thing of the past.”
chilD Sex WoRKeRS in ghana
In response to the rising number of 
child sex workers in Ghana, the govern-
ment has decided to crack down on the 
child prostitution epidemic. The Women 
and Children’s Affairs Ministry reports 
that while actual figures are unavailable, 
the number of child sex workers in Ghana 
is in the thousands. An estimated 20,000 
children live on the streets in the nation’s 
capital, Accra. Dr. Obiri Yeboah, a soci-
ologist at the Accra-Polytechnic Institute, 
believes that Ghana’s increasing urban-
ization and the collapse of the traditional 
extended family system has led to a rise in 
the sex trade. 
Another factor contributing to the 
increasing number of child sex workers has 
been an increasing demand for such ser-
vices. In February 2008, Ghanaian police 
raided the Soldier Bar brothel and arrested 
all of the 160 girls and women working 
there. The specific targets of the raid were 
60 girls who were under the age of 16, 
who had been recruited by the brothel’s 
manager to service teenage clientele. Ini-
tially, the manager did not admit teenage 
boys into the brothel, but as the manager 
told reporters, “… after a while we real-
ized we could make more money if we 
can meet their demands by supplying them 
with younger prostitutes of the same age, 
so we started recruiting child sex workers 
as well.”
The increased number of child prosti-
tutes has also led to an increase in the num-
ber of young girls becoming infected with 
HIV/AIDS. The Ghana AIDS Commission 
estimates that around 25,000 children have 
HIV/AIDS. According to the Commission, 
with no protection and no say in whether 
their male clients use protection, the young 
girls “contract HIV/AIDS and often die 
in silence.” The Commission states that 
the rising number of children becoming 
infected with HIV/AIDS reflects the social 
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structure and poverty of the country, which 
has in turn laid “a fertile foundation for 
such brothels to thrive.”
In response to the crisis, the Ministry of 
Women and Children’s Affairs established 
programs designed to rescue, rehabilitate 
and reintegrate the young sex workers by 
placing them in centers where they can 
receive help. In conjunction with these 
efforts, the Ghanaian police launched a 
“war on child prostitution.” While such 
programs are a step in the right direction, 
they are not perfect. They are significantly 
underfunded, and the lack of personnel and 
accommodations for the young girls often 
makes it difficult to keep track of them. 
Consequently, many girls return to the 
streets to work in the sex trade.
The government plans to involve non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) in its 
efforts, and to teach the girls vocational 
skills so they do not have to resort to the 
sex trade. A committee has also been 
formed to provide further funding to the 
NGOs. As Dr. Yeboah told IRIN, “[t]he 
solution starts with economic empower-
ment and an intensive educational cam-
paign to get families to be more conscious 
of their responsibilities to these children.”
MiDDle eaSt
paleStinianS challenge 
highWay SegRegation in the 
WeSt banK
Highway 443, a major access road 
connecting Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem, has 
emerged as a contentious battleground 
in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Until 
recently, the road primarily served Pales-
tinians, largely because it runs through the 
West Bank. In recent years as violence has 
escalated, Israel has restricted Palestinian 
access to Highway 443. 
In March 2008, the Israeli Supreme 
Court issued an interim decision, accepting 
the idea of separate roads for Palestinians 
in the occupied areas. The Association for 
Civil Rights in Israel, one of the petitioners 
in the case, asserted that establishing sepa-
rate highways for Israelis and Palestinians 
could be the beginning of legal apartheid 
in the West Bank. Palestinian petitioners 
argued that in accordance with the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, Israel, as an occupier, 
has a responsibility to safeguard the needs 
of the Palestinians, who are protected per-
sons. Since highway restrictions burden 
Palestinians in the Palestinian territories, 
for whom Highway 443 was originally 
built, petitioners argued that the segre-
gated road system violated the Geneva 
Convention. 
The Supreme Court’s one-paragraph 
decision calls on the army to give a prog-
ress report within six months on its effort 
to build separate roads and to compensate 
Palestinians because of the road restriction. 
But the court’s acceptance of separate roads 
for Israelis and Palestinians has stimulated 
controversy. In an op-ed in the Jerusalem 
newspaper Haaretz, David Kretzmer, an 
Emeritus Professor of International Law at 
Hebrew University in Jerusalem, criticized 
the “judicial hypocrisy” of Israel’s subju-
gation of the Palestinians. Kretzmer noted 
that while heightened security concerns 
may have forced a change in the road’s 
mixed use, Israelis should not be allowed 
to travel on a road that was primarily built 
for Palestinian use. 
Highway 443 was first challenged in 
the Supreme Court in the early 1980s as an 
illegal expropriation of private Palestinian 
land. In a landmark ruling, Israeli Supreme 
Court Justices ruled that the road was 
permissible because it mainly served local 
Palestinians rather than Israeli commuters. 
Recently, however, the Israeli government 
has restricted Palestinians from using the 
roadway. In defense of implementing a 
two-tiered road system, the Israeli govern-
ment argued that terrorism threats justified 
the exclusion of Palestinians from Highway 
443. In particular, recent suicide bombings 
on the highway were cited as evidence of 
social harm. Some legal commentators 
within Israel have argued that the restric-
tion serves not to reduce terrorism, but to 
reduce traffic to make the commute for 
Israelis more convenient. As an alternative 
to Highway 443, Israel is planning to build 
a new road within the West Bank that links 
the Palestinian villages with Ramallah. 
This road will be used to accommodate 
Palestinian travel. 
Lack of access to Highway 443 has 
severely burdened the 30,000 Palestin-
ians who live in surrounding villages. 
Because the highway connects these vil-
lages to Ramallah, a main city within the 
West Bank, the exclusionary policy greatly 
inconveniences many people. In one vil-
lage, A Tira, only 14 taxis have permits to 
travel the road, and only during daylight. 
Aside from the general inconvenience of 
not being able to use a main artery, by bar-
ring Palestinians from Highway 443, the 
Israeli government is impairing West Bank 
Palestinians access to necessary medical 
care. Instead of using the main highway, 
Palestinians now have to travel longer 
distances to reach services in Ramallah. 
While security interests are critical, the 
Israeli Supreme Court’s decision regard-
ing the permissibility of segregated roads 
poses serious implications for the human 
rights of the Palestinian people. 
aRbitRaRy aRReStS anD toRtuRe 
in libya
At least 14 Libyans were arrested in 
February 2007 for planning to hold a 
peaceful demonstration in Tripoli. On Feb-
ruary 1, 2007, political activists adver-
tised the demonstration on news websites 
based outside Libya. The activists were 
arrested two weeks later, on February 16, 
2007. Idriss Boufayed, one of the activists 
arrested, is an outspoken critic of the Lib-
yan government’s extensive human rights 
violations. The members of the group who 
have been charged are accused of offenses 
including “attempting to overthrow the 
political system,” “possession of weapons 
and explosives with the intention of carry-
ing out subversive activities,” and “com-
munication with enemy powers.” 
According to Amnesty International, 
12 of the 14 Libyans arrested may face 
unfair trials before a newly-created State 
Security Court, and could be given the 
death penalty if found guilty. Although 
Libyan law provides for the presumption 
of innocence and the right to legal counsel, 
in practice, defendants often have little 
contact, if any, with their lawyers. The 
two remaining accused have disappeared 
since their arrests last year. The Libyan 
government has not provided any informa-
tion regarding their whereabouts. Reports 
indicate that all of the men were held in 
solitary confinement for prolonged periods 
and that at least two of them have been 
tortured. During one interrogation session, 
these two men were allegedly punched 
and beaten with sticks, subjected to falaqa 
(beating on the soles of the feet) and put in 
coffins to intimidate them. The men also 
lack access to necessary medical care. 
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As a signatory to the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights (UDHR), the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), and the Convention 
Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment (CAT), Libya must comply with 
international prohibitions against arbitrary 
detention, torture, and cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment. The Libyan govern-
ment is in violation of Article 5 of the 
UDHR; Articles 7, 9, and 10 of the ICCPR; 
and the CAT, for arbitrarily arresting these 
men and for torturing two of them. Under 
Article 5 of the UDHR, Article 7 of the 
ICCPR and the CAT, “[n]o one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment.” 
Subjecting prisoners to physical abuse con-
stitutes either torture or cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment. Moreover, confining 
individuals in coffins is unquestionably a 
cruel punishment that violates international 
law. 
Article 9 of the ICCPR stipulates that 
“[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
arrest or detention.” Although the detain-
ees have been charged with crimes, the 
offenses reported are arbitrary and have 
not been supported by any credible evi-
dence. The charges merely mask the true 
purpose for the arrests: to suppress crit-
icism of the government. Additionally, 
Article 10 of the ICCPR states that “[a]ll 
persons deprived of their liberty shall be 
treated with humanity and with respect for 
the inherent dignity of the human person.” 
Prolonged arbitrary detention and torture 
indisputably violate this provision. 
Amnesty International asserts that the 
men were exercising their right to freedom 
of expression and calls for their immediate 
and unconditional release. The organiza-
tion has also urged the Libyan government 
to ensure that the men are receiving access 
to medical care and that the authorities 
conduct a thorough, impartial investigation 
into this matter.
SyRian SecuRity FoRceS’ Killing 
oF KuRDS RaiSeS conceRn oF 
unneceSSaRy lethal FoRce
On March 20, 2008, Syrian security 
forces shot and killed three Kurds and 
wounded at least five others at a New 
Year’s celebration. Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) asserts that the circumstances of the 
shootings raise concerns that state security 
forces used unnecessary lethal force in vio-
lation of international law. About 200 peo-
ple gathered on a road in the Western part 
of Qamishli and lit candles and a bonfire, 
around which some participants performed 
a traditional Kurdish dance. Firefighters 
extinguished the bonfire while police and 
intelligence officers fired tear gas canisters 
and live ammunition in the air to disperse 
the crowd. According to witnesses, secu-
rity forces indiscriminately opened fire 
when the crowd failed to  disperse. 
Because none of the Kurds were armed 
or behaving violently, it is unclear what 
provoked the security forces to use deadly 
force. This, however, is not the first time 
that Syrian forces have used force to dis-
rupt a Kurdish celebration. In March 2006, 
security officers arrested dozens of Kurds 
and used tear gas and batons to break up 
New Year’s festivities. In addition, in 
March 2004, 25 people were killed and 
more than 100 wounded when riots broke 
out between Syrian Kurds and Arabs dur-
ing a soccer match in Qamishli. Nearly 
2,000 Kurds were arrested by the Syrian 
security forces following the riots. Despite 
calls for Syrian officials to justify the use 
of lethal force, these authorities have thus 
far not issued an official statement on the 
most recent incident.
HRW maintains that Syrian security 
forces should comply with the United 
Nations Basic Principles on the Use of 
Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement 
Officials. These principles mandate that 
law enforcement officials exercise non-
violent means before resorting to the use 
of force. Furthermore, force should only 
be exerted in proportion to the gravity of 
the offense, and lethal force only when 
necessary to protect life. Reports strongly 
suggest that the use of lethal force does not 
withstand the proportionality and necessity 
requirements. Specifically, the fact that the 
participants were unarmed and were not 
engaging in violent activity raises serious 
suspicion of an illegitimate state response. 
HRW has called on Syrian authorities 
to conduct an independent, transparent 
investigation into the shootings and hold 
accountable those individuals responsible.
 
euRope
tuRKey liFtS heaDScaRF ban in 
public univeRSitieS
In February 2008 the Turkish parlia-
ment passed two constitutional amend-
ments, lifting the ban on headscarves in 
public universities. Although Turkey is 
over 99 percent Muslim, it has remained a 
secular state in line with the policies of its 
revered secular founder Kemal Ataturk. In 
keeping with its commitment to secular-
ism, Turkey banned women from wearing 
headscarves while attending public univer-
sities and working in the public sector for 
two decades. Although this ban is based 
on a 1989 Constitutional Court ruling, it 
has only been strictly enforced since the 
1997 military-led expulsion from power 
of Turkey’s first Islamist Prime Minister 
Necmettin Erbakan. 
The ban is widely seen as unjust and 
unequally enforced. University rectors 
often tacitly allow some students to wear 
their headscarves, while prohibiting others, 
who for example, evade the rule by wear-
ing wigs or wigs over their headscarves, 
from attending school. As a result of the 
ban, many women, including the daughters 
of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan, choose to go abroad to pursue 
their higher educations. Since its rise to 
power in 2002, the governing Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) has been under 
pressure from its conservative base to lift 
the ban. 
The change, which was proposed by the 
Islamic-rooted AKP, alters two articles of 
the Constitution, amending it to read that 
no one can be barred from education for 
reasons not clearly laid out by law and that 
everyone has the right to equal treatment 
from state institutions, including universi-
ties. President Abdullah Gul, who had his 
daughter wear a wig over her headscarf 
during the ban, ratified the bill. The legis-
lation was prompted when the Prime Min-
ister commented to the press in Madrid that 
“Even if wearing a headscarf is a political 
symbol, can you ban a political symbol?” 
Since this statement, the Nationalist Action 
Party (MHP), a hard-line group that has 
resisted reforms that would bring Turkey 
closer to EU membership, has continued 
to push the cause. The AKP formed an 
alliance with the MHP to pass the new leg-
islation. The two groups, who control more 
than the two-thirds of the parliamentary 
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votes necessary to pass the amendment, 
struck a deal in late January.
The Turkish parliament began debat-
ing the amendments on February 6. The 
amendment passed an initial parliamentary 
vote that same day and was passed by a 
final vote on February 9. Parliament must 
now draft legislation, which will provide 
for the shape and type of the permitted 
headscarves. Nearly 100 of Turkey’s 116 
universities are still observing the ban.
President Gul, whose wife considered 
challenging Turkey’s headscarf ban in 
the European Court of Human Rights, 
expressed his support for the amendment, 
stating that “beliefs should be practiced 
freely.” The AKP claims that this is an 
issue of women’s rights. Additionally, 
opinion polls indicate that two-thirds of the 
Turkish public support lifting the ban.
However, there has also been vehement 
opposition to the new amendment from 
groups including the judiciary, business 
organizations and academics, who claim 
that it is a step towards turning Turkey into 
a religious state. The military, which has 
overturned four civilian governments and 
has acted as a guardian of the country’s 
secular system, has thus far only voiced its 
opposition to the amendments. In March, 
a prosecutor filed a case against the AKP 
for its anti-secularism, largely based on 
its support of the headscarf. A case has 
also been filed against the constitutional 
amendments as well. Public opposition 
has been most apparent at public protests, 
which have involved tens of thousands 
of people. The first took place outside 
the mausoleum of Ataturk, and the sec-
ond occurred on February 9, when people 
gathered in Ankara to voice their dissent. 
Critics fear that lifting the ban threatens 
Turkey’s existence as a secular state and 
compromises its chances at becoming a 
member of the European Union (EU).
Even supporters of the constitutional 
amendment have voiced concerns about 
its specificity. The amendment only allows 
women to wear one traditional kind of 
headscarf, which ties under the throat, 
while still banning other styles. This appar-
ent mandate on fashion has drawn criticism 
spanning from women’s groups to experts 
on the constitution. Further, lifting the ban 
will only affect public universities; the ban 
will still apply to women working in the 
public sector. Many view the narrow scope 
of this change as indicative of the patriar-
chy of Turkish society and the place that 
women hold in it.
Although Ali Babacan, Turkey’s for-
eign minister, claimed that this change is 
part of the movement towards fulfilling EU 
membership requirements, EU officials 
have said that this is a Turkish domestic 
matter. They have also expressed concern 
that in its haste to resolve the headscarf 
issue, the AKP has stalled on other reforms 
that are related to EU membership, includ-
ing the passage of its new “civilianized 
constitution” and the amendment of Article 
301 of the penal code, which outlaws 
insulting “Turkishness” and has marred 
Turkey’s record on freedom of expression. 
Most importantly, the AKP has suspended 
parliamentary debate over a bill that would 
return state-confiscated property of reli-
gious minority groups as a result of its 
reluctance to upset the nationalist National 
Action Party (MHP), the third largest party 
in the Turkish parliament, which opposes 
such legislation.
Critics of the amendments charge that 
the AKP must prove its commitment to 
democracy. The bill now faces a legal chal-
lenge brought by The Republican People’s 
Party (CHP) to the Constitutional Court in 
an effort to block this amendment.
poSSible change to  
RoMania’S FaMily coDe 
thReatenS gay RightS
As one of the last European countries 
to decriminalize homosexuality, Roma-
nia has made great strides in promoting 
equality over the past decade. As a result 
of ten years of advocacy by human rights 
groups, the country repealed its law against 
“manifestations of homosexuality” in 2001. 
Since then, Romania has passed legislation 
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual 
orientation in employment and public ser-
vices. Romania also allows individuals 
who have undergone gender reassignment 
to change their identity. Upon entry into 
the EU, Romania was required to recog-
nize same-sex couples that were registered 
in other member states. A December 2006 
poll by the EU, however, revealed that 
only 11 percent of Romanians approve of 
same-sex marriages. 
Currently, Article 1(3) of Romania’s 
family code, which dates back to 1953, 
defines family in gender-neutral terms, stat-
ing that it is based on “marriage between 
spouses.” A proposed amendment to this 
code would narrow the definition of mar-
riage as exclusively between a man and 
a woman. The Romanian Senate’s Judi-
ciary Committee debated and adopted this 
amendment, which expressly bans mar-
riage between same-sex partners. Roma-
nian senators approved the amendment 
on February 13, 2008, and it will now be 
considered by the Chamber of Deputies.
The amendment has garnered support 
from many groups. Its largest supporter is 
the Greater Romanian Party, a nationalist, 
right-wing party led by former presiden-
tial candidate Corneliu Vadim Tudor. The 
party justifies the amendment as “defending 
the institution of marriage.” Additionally, 
some religious groups have been instru-
mental in supporting the legislation. The 
Alliance of Romania’s Families, formed 
last year, collected more than 650,000 sig-
natures in support of the amendment. The 
amendment also gained international sup-
port from the World Congress of Families. 
Social Democratic Party Senator Serban 
Nicolae, who proposed the amendment, 
claims that the amendment would not 
infringe on European norms.
The legislation, however, has also 
encountered significant opposition. Human 
Rights Watch is one of its most outspoken 
critics. The organization’s Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual and Transgender Rights Program 
stated that “these proposals not only delib-
erately discriminate against same-sex cou-
ples but threaten their families, including 
children.” It characterized the legislation as 
“an insult to Romania’s achievements else-
where in overcoming discrimination.” The 
organization sent a letter to government 
officials, urging them to reject the amend-
ment. Sexual orientation-related-advocacy 
groups have followed suit by beginning 
their own letter-writing campaigns.
If the changes to the family code are 
implemented, the impact of this legislation 
is likely to be far-reaching. Human Rights 
Watch predicts that introducing inequality 
into the law will deprive many Roma-
nian families of basic civil rights. Senator 
Gyorgy Frunda of the Democratic Union 
of Magyars (UDMR), a party that repre-
sents ethnic Hungarians in Romania, has 
voiced concerns that the amendment could 
result in Romania being brought before the 
European Court of Human Rights.
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South anD centRal aSia
taJiKiStan: eFFoRtS to 
MoDeRnize cRiMinal coDe May 
Fall ShoRt oF inteRnational 
huMan RightS laW
In March Tajikistan modernized its 
criminal code to comply with interna-
tional human rights laws by adopting an 
exclusionary rule. Now, evidence obtained 
through unlawful means, including tor-
ture or coercion, can no longer be used 
against the accused and will be excluded 
from trial. In 2007, the International Hel-
sinki Federation Annual Report on Human 
Rights Violations and the United Nations 
Committee Against Torture (the Com-
mittee) reported frequent human rights 
violations in connection with arrest and 
detention procedures in Tajikistan. The 
Committee was particularly concerned that 
evidence gathered through torture by law 
enforcement officials was used in legal 
proceedings against the accused. The Com-
mittee reported that this was partially due 
to a lack of legislation prohibiting the 
use of illegally acquired evidence. The 
Government of Tajikistan responded by 
updating the criminal code. The updating 
process has been ongoing since Tajikistan 
independence in 1991. 
Despite efforts to bring the law into 
compliance with the Convention against 
Torture (CAT), there are still deficien-
cies in the criminal code and within law 
enforcement methods that will make the 
application of the exclusionary rule dif-
ficult. First, the provision excluding ille-
gally obtained evidence does not specify 
whether all evidence stemming from a 
substantial violation of the criminal code 
would be excluded or only the evidence 
directly acquired through illegal means 
such as torture and coercion. Furthermore, 
courts have not given any criteria to decide 
whether evidence is excludable or not. For 
these reasons, the exclusionary rule may 
not, in practice, protect the rights of Tajiki-
stan’s citizens. 
Second, the definition of torture in 
Tajikistan’s criminal code does not com-
ply with the definition of torture under 
the CAT. Tajikistan’s definition does not 
include the CAT’s definition, “the inflic-
tion of pain and suffering by, at the insti-
gation of, or with the consent or acquiesce 
of a public official or other person act-
ing in an official capacity.” Furthermore, 
law enforcement officials are not trained 
on legal methods of obtaining evidence 
without the use of torture. While non-
governmental organizations received, and 
reported to the Committee, a number of 
complaints of police torture, very few 
resulted in legal proceedings against law 
enforcement officials. These deficiencies 
point to the fact that there is no liability or 
penalty against law enforcement officials 
for illegal conduct. It is yet to be seen 
how Tajikistan’s exclusionary rule will 
be applied and whether it will adequately 
protect the rights of those accused. 
If there is no repercussion for using 
illegal means to obtain evidence, then there 
is no disincentive to law enforcement for 
using torture or threats to obtain evidence. 
Although pressure by the International Hel-
sinki Federation Annual Report on Human 
Rights Violations and the Committee were 
successful in amending Tajikistan’s Crimi-
nal Code, significant measures have not 
been taken by Tajikistan’s Parliament to 
ensure that evidence obtained through tor-
ture and threats will not be used in legal 
proceedings against the accused. 
banglaDeSh: high couRtS 
eFFoRtS to upholD conStitution 
quaSheD
On March 17, 2008, the Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh took 
away jurisdictional authority of two High 
Court judges after the judges challenged 
the Emergency Power Rules (EPR), which 
have been in effect since January 12, 2007. 
Officials have explained the judges’ loss of 
some authority as a “routine reallocation 
of power.” There is skepticism, however, 
as to the real reasons behind the Supreme 
Court’s mandate removing jurisdiction 
from the High Court judges. 
The mandate came just two days before 
the High Court was scheduled to hear a 
petition challenging the validity of military 
rule. The military government promised to 
hold national elections but has failed to do 
so since the emergency was promulgated 
last year. The High Court has also recently 
declared illegal the extortion case against 
former Prime Minister Sheik Hasina under 
the EPR and quashed the trial proceedings. 
The High Court held that since the EPR is 
unconstitutional, hearings on her extortion 
case cannot be held until the constitution is 
restored and emergency rule has ended. 
The former Prime Minister was arrested 
on July 24, 2007, six months after emer-
gency rule was declared. She is accused of 
extorting money from the Managing Direc-
tor of Eastcoast Trading Pvt. Ltd., Azam 
Chowdhury, in exchange for granting East-
coast a contract to set up a power plant in 
Bangladesh. On July 30, 2007 the High 
Court held that the EPR cannot be retro-
actively applied because the circumstances 
of Hasina’s extortion case occurred before 
the EPR was promulgated. Moreover, the 
High Court held that it would be a viola-
tion of the Constitution if a crime com-
mitted before the promulgation of the EPR 
is tried under the EPR: only a crime com-
mitted after the EPR’s promulgation could 
be tried under the EPR. The High Court 
further reiterated its power and authority 
to adjudicate cases relating to bail despite 
the EPR. In light of the Constitution of 
Bangladesh, the High Court held that the 
Emergency Rules limiting the right to 
bail are unenforceable against Hasina. On 
review, the Supreme Court overruled the 
High Court’s decision in the extortion case 
and bail order. The Supreme Court held 
that the High Courts did not have jurisdic-
tion to grant bail under the EPR. 
Under Bangladesh’s Constitution, a 
state of emergency authorizes the suspen-
sion of fundamental rights of citizens and 
bans all political activity. While the state 
of emergency might have been necessary 
last year, recently the High Courts, through 
judicial decisions, have been putting pres-
sure on the military government to lift the 
state of emergency. In these decisions, the 
High Courts have held that the procedures 
and processes of the military under the 
EPR are illegal and void. The High Court 
judges, along with many other Benga-
lis, believe there is no longer a need for 
military rule. They are calling for a return 
to civilian rule and a restoration of the 
Constitution of Bangladesh. The Supreme 
Court, however, is upholding the EPR and 
showing no independence from the mili-
tary government.
The emergency government, led by 
Fakhruddin Ahmed, took power on Janu-
ary 12, 2008 — one day after elections 
were cancelled. Bangladesh has a his-
tory of military rule. There have been 
19 coup attempts in Bangladesh since it 
gained independence in 1971. In this latest 
promulgation of emergency rule, the High 
Courts have attempted to show judicial 
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independence from the military govern-
ment. The High Court’s efforts to hold the 
EPR unconstitutional and show their inde-
pendence, however, have been frustrated 
by the Supreme Court’s backing of the 
military government.
the MalDiveS: neW 
conStitution coulD Mean enD 
to pReSiDent’S 30 yeaR teRM
After 30 years of what many consider 
to be a dictatorship by President Maumoon 
Abdul Gayoom, the Maldives is in the 
process of promulgating a new constitu-
tion with democratic separation of powers 
between the executive, parliamentary, and 
judicial branches of government. Under 
the current constitution, there is no inde-
pendent judiciary. The President holds the 
position as the highest judicial authority. 
Parliament is eager to draft a new consti-
tution before November 8, 2008, the date 
President Gayoom’s term expires. Consti-
tutional reform will dramatically change 
the government in the Maldives and allow 
for free and fair elections for the first time 
in the country’s history. 
The Maldives is known for corruption 
and lack of democracy. Political parties 
were only legalized in 2005 after demon-
strations calling for government reforms. 
The President appoints 29 members of 
Parliament from his party, the Dhivehi 
Raiyyithunge Party (DRP), and for this 
reason, the DRP holds a built-in majority 
in Parliament. The DRP drafted a proposal 
allowing President Gayoom to continue 
for another term after the expiration of his 
term on November 11, 2008. The oppo-
sition party, the Maldivian Democratic 
Party (MDP), however, argues that since 
Gayoom has held the Presidential office 
for 30 years, he should not be allowed to 
run for another term. This dispute cumu-
lated on April 3, 2008, when the DRP 
walked out of the Parliament building just 
as Parliament was about to vote on the 
term-extending amendment. The DRP and 
MDP are now in the process of continuing 
negotiations over proposals in the consti-
tution and are in a rush to employ a new 
constitution before President Gayoom’s 
term expires.  
The Constitution of the Maldives 
was last amended in 1997; however, it is 
believed that these amendments were made 
without fair consultation with Parliament. 
This is the first time in 30 years that mem-
bers of Parliament are consulting on every 
proposal presented by the parties. 
It is widely believed that President 
Gayoom won the 2003 elections illegally. 
Opposition political parties are reluctant to 
approve a proposal that would allow him to 
run for another term. They believe if he is 
able to run, then there will be no chance for 
fair elections. The MDP instead demands 
that an interim government be put in place 
before elections to guarantee that the pro-
cess is more fair and free. 
eaSt anD SoutheaSt aSia 
anD the paciFic
MinoRity RightS iSSueS 
ReShape political lanDScape in 
MalaySian election
Malaysia’s March 8, 2008 elections 
may be seen as a rebuff of its anti-minor-
ity policies and restrictions on political 
expression. Despite controlling all major 
print and broadcast media and limiting 
opposition parties’ access to the political 
process, the ruling National Front coali-
tion led by the United Malays National 
Organization (UMNO) lost its two-thirds 
majority in parliament and ceded control 
of five states. For the first time since 1969, 
the National Front will not have the super-
majority in parliament necessary to amend 
the constitution at will. 
The National Front’s political setback 
was fueled in part by minority rights groups, 
such as the Hindu Rights Action Force 
(Hindraf), who assert that the government 
denies ethnic Indians their political, eco-
nomic, and religious freedoms. Malaysia 
is comprised of three main ethnic groups: 
over half of the population is Malay, 23 
percent is Chinese, and seven percent is 
Indian. Many Indians are upset by unequal 
funding provided to Tamil-speaking public 
schools and by the New Economic Policy 
(NEP), an affirmative action program that 
favors the Malay majority. The NEP was 
originally instituted in 1971 to combat 
social and economic disparities between 
Malays and ethnic Chinese. Today, minori-
ties such as ethnic Indians feel discrimi-
nated against by policies that guarantee 
Malays discounts on new housing and 
place 30 percent quotas on government 
jobs. 
The National Front has controlled the 
Parliament since Malaysia gained indepen-
dence from the British in 1957. Emergency 
rule was declared in the wake of race riots 
in 1969 and civil and political liberties are 
limited to this day. The National Front con-
tinues to suppress political expression to 
maintain electoral dominance. The police 
restrict opposition groups from assembling 
freely by denying them permits to hold 
public gatherings of four or more people, 
while National Front leaders routinely 
organize public rallies. Prime Minister 
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi freely spoke in 
front of 20,000 supporters a week before 
the election, and opposition groups face 
excessive force from police. Police used 
tear gas and water cannons to break up a 
peaceful Hindraf march on February 16, 
2008. 
The National Front denies media access 
to those with opposing viewpoints. The 
Sedition Act and Printing Press Publica-
tions Act are used to stifle public criticism 
of government officials. All private televi-
sion stations are owned by UMNO, and 
the government wields heavy influence 
over all major newspapers. Prime Min-
ister Badawi, who serves as the Minister 
of Internal Security, can effectively shut 
down any publication by revoking its per-
mit to operate.
philippine SupReMe couRt 
upholDS executive pRivilege
The Supreme Court of the Philip pines 
may have further enabled the Admin-
istration, led by President Gloria Macapa-
gal Arroyo, to resist litigation filed against 
it for committing hundreds of extrajudicial 
killings and enforced disappearances, by 
upholding a claim of executive privilege 
on March 25, 2008. In Neri v. Senate, the 
court overturned a contempt citation and 
arrest order compelling former National 
Economic Development Authority Direc-
tor General Romulo Neri to testify before 
the Philippine Senate. Neri refused to talk 
about conversations he had with President 
Arroyo regarding alleged bribery in a con-
troversial deal, which awarded a Chinese 
telecommunications company a contract 
to construct the government-managed 
National Broadband Network. The Court 
held that as a member of the Cabinet, 
Neri’s conversations with the President 
were privileged, and the Senate would 
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have to show “compelling need” and “the 
unavailability of the information elsewhere 
by an appropriate investigation authority.”
Human rights organizations in the Phil-
ippines, such as the Free Legal Assistance 
Group (FLAG), are concerned that the 
Arroyo Administration will use the rul-
ing to claim executive privilege when 
confronted with allegations of rampant 
extrajudicial killings and kidnappings by 
the military. In 2006 President Arroyo 
vowed to eradicate the New People’s Army 
(NPA), a communist insurgent group, and 
a dramatic spike in extrajudicial killings 
followed. Military and paramilitary forces 
have not only targeted leftists, but also 
continue to attack groups or individuals 
who criticize the government. In 2007, 
the United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial Killings reported that at least 
100 journalists, labor leaders, land reform 
advocates, and church members had been 
kidnapped or killed by the military since 
2005. Although the Arroyo Administra-
tion set up a taskforce to investigate these 
incidents, no member of the military has 
been convicted of extrajudicial killing or 
enforced disappearance. 
In response to international criticism, 
the Supreme Court, in July 2007, created 
new rules establishing the writ of amparo, 
designed to prevent the government from 
stalling enforced disappearance cases. 
Usually, when a family member of a miss-
ing person files a habeas corpus petition, 
government officials simply deny that the 
person is in its custody. Now when a writ 
of amparo is filed, the government must 
produce evidence proving that the person 
is not in its custody. The government must 
also look for the person, and if the court 
finds the search effort insufficient, the 
government could be held liable. 
Philippine courts have yet to enforce a 
writ of amparo case, and jurisprudence on 
the subject is still up in the air. Critics of 
Neri v. Senate, such as FLAG, fear that the 
expansion of the executive privilege doc-
trine may enable the government to resist 
writ of amparo claims, making the new 
human rights legal tool ineffective.
china avoiDS conDeMnation 
FRoM uniteD nationS huMan 
RightS council on tibet
The United Nations Human Rights 
Council (HRC) failed to pass a resolu-
tion addressing the abuse of protesters in 
Tibet. In the HRC’s four-week session 
that concluded on March 28, 2008, China 
repeatedly blocked discussion of its recent 
crackdown on demonstrations.
Violence erupted in Tibet on March 
14 after the Chinese government arrested 
Buddhist Monks, who staged a peaceful 
march outside the capital city of Lhasa 
on March 10 to commemorate the failed 
uprising of 1959. The Seven Point Agree-
ment of 1951 officially incorporated Tibet 
into the People’s Republic of China but 
established an autonomous government 
headed by the Dalai Lama. Chinese land 
redistribution programs disrupted the deli-
cate relationship with Tibet when noble-
men and feudal lords stripped of their land 
organized a revolt.
After the March 10 arrests, protests 
spread to other cities in Tibet, western 
Chinese provinces, and Tibetan communi-
ties in Nepal and India. Riots broke out 
in Lhasa and other cities in the western 
Chinese provinces of Gansu, Sichuan, and 
Qinghai. Rioters flipped cars and torched 
shops belonging to ethnic Hans, who make 
up the majority in China. Chinese military 
police violently broke up the protests and 
opened fire into the crowds. The Chi-
nese government claims that 18 civilians, 
mostly Hans, died in the violence, and 
that another 625 were injured, but Tibetan 
rights groups report more than 140 Tibetan 
civilian deaths. Independent news agen-
cies have been unable to make an accurate 
casualty count because the Chinese gov-
ernment expelled foreign journalists from 
the region shortly after the demonstrations 
began. 
Although delegations from the United 
States, Australia, and the European Union 
made declarations about the violence in 
Tibet at the HRC meeting, China cut off 
discussion by making procedural objec-
tions. HRC President Doru Costea upheld 
the objections by ruling that discussion of 
country-specific human rights situations 
was only allowed in special sessions deal-
ing with individual countries. Although 
the HRC held special sessions addressing 
specific human rights issues in Burma and 
Israel, China avoided such scrutiny.
China’s economic power is influential 
with many Asian and African countries, 
which make up more than half of the 
HRC’s 47 members. China provides politi-
cal cover for other countries with poor 
human rights records, such as Sudan and 
Burma, by maintaining strong diplomatic 
and trade ties when the rest of the inter-
national community is levying sanctions. 
China continues to trade arms for oil with 
Sudan, debilitating other states’ embargo 
efforts and fueling the conflict in the 
Darfur region that has killed more than 
200,000 people. 
China remains the closest ally to the 
military junta that governs Burma, supply-
ing the majority of its arms and military 
training. After the Burmese junta violently 
quashed large scale protests in late 2007, 
China blocked a resolution at an emer-
gency session of United Nations Security 
Council calling for global economic sanc-
tions. While the HRC passed a resolution 
condemning the junta’s actions in Burma, 
it remained silent on China’s actions in 
Tibet.                                    HRB
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